M&A deal teams should take note of heightened scrutiny of HR and employment practices by antitrust enforcers in the US and Europe.

By Richard Butterwick, David Little, Elizabeth Prewitt, Sarah Gadd, Joshua Chalkley, Anuj Ghai, Catherine Campbell, and Peter Citron

No-poach, non-solicitation, and wage-fixing agreements — arrangements between companies seeking to agree wages, or prevent or limit the hiring of each other’s employees that are not ancillary and narrowly-tailored to a legitimate transaction such as an M&A deal or joint venture — can lead to significant fines and even criminal sanctions, as well as private damages litigation. Parental liability for European antitrust failings by a group company can arise even in the case of a minority stake, and even if the parent company had no involvement in or awareness of the wrongdoing.

By Greg Bonné, Jonathan Parker, Richard Butterwick, Terry Charalambous, and Catherine Campbell

As the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) prepares to assume sole jurisdiction for UK competition reviews post-Brexit, M&A deal teams must evaluate the competitive consequences of deals bridging the Brexit period and update their competition strategy accordingly.

Corporates may not be able to implement the same merger control strategies as in the past.

By Jonathan Parker, Calum Warren, and Catherine Campbell

The UK government has assumed an increasingly interventionist approach to foreign takeovers in recent years. In June 2018, the UK adopted new powers to review deals on national security grounds, extending the scope and breadth of its control regime. In July, the UK went a step further and published a White Paper on a new and significantly extended foreign investment notification regime, which likely will lead to wider and closer scrutiny of many transactions, including private equity deals.

The government’s jurisdiction over transactions is expanding with most areas of the economy within scope, new information-gathering powers, longer review periods, and stricter penalties for noncompliance. Changes could come into effect as early as next year, and deal teams must assess the implications for private equity deals.

National security review anticipated to catch more deals than current merger control regime

The new regime is intentionally broad and has the potential to catch almost all deals. Indeed, the government has made it clear that no sector is off limits. Energy, communications, transport, and nuclear likely will receive the most focus; however, national security concerns can arise in any deal.

By Jonathan Parker and Greg Bonné

As the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) prepares to assume sole jurisdiction for UK competition reviews post-Brexit, private equity deal teams must evaluate the competitive consequences of deals bridging the Brexit period and update their competition strategy accordingly.

What is Changing?

The European Commission (EC) currently acts as a one-stop-shop supranational authority for large transactions that meet Europe-wide competition turnover thresholds, obviating the need for competition filings in individual Member States. However, post-Brexit, transactions impacting competition in the UK and the EU will become concurrently reviewable, i.e., the CMA will review UK aspects and the EC will review European aspects. A significant increase in the number of UK merger reviews carried out by the CMA is likely — the CMA believes that Brexit could result in a further 50 notifications per year, nearly doubling its current workload.

Why Does it Matter?

Timing for the establishment of the CMA’s separate jurisdiction is uncertain. At the earliest, jurisdiction could be effective immediately after the UK leaves the EU  on 29 March 2019. A two-year stay is also possible, depending on the terms of separation. The period building up to the CMA’s separate jurisdiction is likely to be the trickiest for deal teams to navigate. PE firms may not be able to implement the same merger control strategies as in the past.

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