Internal controls must be tailored, proportionate, and risk-based — not just a “paper exercise”.
By Erin Brown Jones, Clare Nida, and Matthew Unsworth
Last week, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) published its updated “Guidance on Evaluating a Corporate Compliance Programme” (the Guidance). The agency’s previous guidance was published in 2020 as an eight-page segment in the SFO Operational Handbook. The latest iteration is very much public-facing, with a helpful FAQ section and updates to reflect the “failure

In a recent speech that has garnered significant attention, US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco highlighted several important changes in how the US Department of Justice (DOJ) will pursue corporate crime during the Biden Administration. (Read Latham’s in-depth 
No-poach, non-solicitation, and wage-fixing agreements — arrangements between companies seeking to agree wages, or prevent or limit the hiring of each other’s employees that are not ancillary and narrowly-tailored to a legitimate transaction such as an M&A deal or joint venture — can lead to significant fines and even criminal sanctions, as well as private damages litigation. Parental liability for European antitrust failings by a group company can arise even in the case of a minority stake, and even if the parent company had no involvement in or awareness of the wrongdoing.
Buyout firms and portfolio companies should take note of heightened scrutiny of HR and employment practices by antitrust enforcers, both in the US and in Europe. No-poach and wage-fixing agreements — arrangements between companies seeking to agree wages, or prevent or limit the hiring of each other’s employees — can lead to significant fines and even criminal sanctions, as well as private damages litigation. Parental liability for European antitrust failings can arise even in the case of a minority stake, and even where the buyout firm had no involvement in or awareness of the wrongdoing.
It is well known that a corporate’s failure to prevent offences can be answered with a defence of “adequate procedures” in a case of bribery or “reasonable procedures” in a case of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. However, with no case law to aid comprehension of what “adequate” or “reasonable” mean, UK corporates are forced to seek answers elsewhere.