dispute resolution

Subscribe to dispute resolution via RSS
Rear view of themis statue

A recent ruling confirms judicial discretion to stay proceedings and instruct parties to seek non-court-based alternatives to litigation.

By Nell Perks and Duncan Graves

The English Court of Appeal has ruled that the court has the authority to stay proceedings and direct the parties to engage in a “non-court based dispute resolution process”. The court can exercise such authority provided the order does not impair the essence of the claimant’s right to proceed to a judicial hearing and is proportionate to achieving the aim of settling the dispute fairly, quickly, and at reasonable cost.[1]

Consistent with the overriding objective which requires the court to actively manage cases and facilitate alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the ruling clarifies the court’s case management powers and signals a potential move toward court-mandated dispute resolution processes.

The judgment clarifies the Court’s approach to proposed transfers under Part VII of FSMA, as well as the scope and application of s. 110(1)(b). 

On 24 November 2021, the High Court of England and Wales (the Court) sanctioned a £10.1 billion annuity book transfer from The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (PAC) to Rothesay Life Plc (Rothesay) under Part VII of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).

The Court previously declined to sanction the transfer following an initial sanction hearing in July 2019. The Court of Appeal then overturned that decision in December 2020 after an appeal by PAC and Rothesay, and the transfer was remitted to the Court for a further sanction hearing between 8-10 November 2021 before the honourable Mr Justice Trower (the Remitted Sanction Hearing). The Court’s judgment following the Remitted Sanction Hearing was handed down on 24 November 2021 (the Judgment), and provides useful guidance on certain aspects of the Part VII process.

Will the UK join the Lugano Convention 2007?

By Oliver Browne and Tom Watret

Introduction

Conflicting reports have emerged in recent days as to whether the EU will approve the UK’s application to join the Lugano Convention 2007, the UK’s preferred regime for governing jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments with EU Member States after Brexit. This post briefly describes what the Lugano Convention 2007 is and why the UK wants to join it, and provides an update on the accession process.

Previous posts in this series consider the Lugano Convention 2007 in more detail (Part 1: here) and explain the rules that now apply to jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in the UK following the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020 (Parts 2-4: here, here, and here).

Parties seeking to rely on video-link evidence should plan ahead and, where necessary, obtain local and foreign court approval.

By Dan Smith

The COVID-19 pandemic has (albeit by necessity) ushered in a move towards remote justice. The vaccine rollout continues, and as lockdown restrictions begin to ease, English courts are now considering to what extent that move towards remote justice should continue. Most likely, remote hearings will continue in appropriate cases.

Against this background, the High Court has, in a number of recent decisions, provided some timely reminders for practitioners as to (i) proper arrangements for giving video-link evidence, and (ii) the need, in some cases, to obtain foreign court permission in respect of giving video-link evidence abroad.

Two recent English cases illustrate the court’s receptiveness to disclosure orders in relation to informal communications on personal devices.

By Dan Smith and Aisling Billington

In two recent decisions, the English Court has demonstrated a pragmatic and targeted approach to ordering disclosure of material held on personal devices of third parties, and a recognition of the value of informal communications as evidence of disputed factual allegations. The decisions are discussed below.

Regardless of whether disclosure is sought under the existing provisions of the Civil Procedure Rule (CPR), or the Disclosure Pilot Scheme, the Court will apply the principle of proportionality in making or varying an order for disclosure. Notably, while the Court is mindful of the privacy rights of individuals, there is increasing recognition that work is carried out on personal electronic devices (including over more informal channels such as WhatsApp), any mingling of personal and work data will not itself be sufficient to circumvent a disclosure order.

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement has now been agreed. So what rules will apply to jurisdiction and foreign judgments in the UK from 1 January 2021?

By Oliver Browne and Tom Watret

Introduction

It has been a long time in the making, but the UK and EU have finally reached an agreement (the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement) on their future relationship after the end of the Brexit transition period, which expires today, 31 December 2020.[i]

It has been known since the referendum result on 23 June 2016 that the rules applicable to jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments would change after Brexit, since the regime that currently applies — the Brussels Recast Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels Recast) — is only available to EU Member States.

In previous posts in this series, we explained the different rules which could apply to jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments in the UK from 1 January 2021, covering the Lugano Convention 2007 (here), the Hague Convention 2005 (here), and the UK’s common law rules (here), in both “deal” and “no deal” situations.

Now that we have a deal, this post provides an overview of the applicable rules.

Court of Appeal sets out correct approach to transfer of long-term Insurance.

By Victoria Sander, Jon Holland, Alex Cox, and Duncan Graves

Latham & Watkins has won an appeal on behalf of Rothesay Life Plc (Rothesay) in an unprecedented challenge to the High Court’s refusal to sanction the transfer of around 370,000 annuity policies in August 2019 (comprising total policyholder liabilities of approximately £11.2 billion) from The Prudential Assurance Company Limited (PAC) to Rothesay.

The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s refusal to sanction the scheme in a judgment[1] handed down on 2 December 2020, and set out the correct approach for a court to adopt when dealing with applications to sanction transfers of insurance business under Part VII of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).  The case is the first time an application under Part VII FSMA has been considered in detail by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the judge was “not justified in making an adverse comparison between the financial strength, record and expectations of PAC and Rothesay”; that his reasoning had been based on a misunderstanding of the applicable financial metrics; and that he did not give adequate weight to the views of the independent actuarial expert or the on-going regulatory role of the PRA.  The Court of Appeal also held that, although non-actuarial factors may be relevant to the assessment of some Part VII applications, the subjective choice of provider by policyholders is not a relevant factor to be considered.

English law, courts and arbitral tribunals may become more relevant and popular after Brexit, not less.

By Oliver Browne, Sophie J. Lamb QC, Sanjev D. Warna-kula-suriya, and Tom Watret

Introduction

English law, courts, and arbitral tribunals may become more relevant and popular after Brexit, not less, and parties should continue to feel confident about including English governing law and jurisdiction clauses in their agreements.

In particular, the breadth of English common law jurisdiction and the powerful tools at the English courts’ disposal – notably, the anti-suit injunction and damages for breach of jurisdiction clauses – are likely to ensure that jurisdiction clauses in favour of English courts and tribunals are complied with.

Four recent developments highlight the benefit of arbitration clauses amidst uncertainty about choice of court clauses.

By Oliver Browne and Tom Watret

Introduction

With the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020 fast approaching, four new important and interrelated developments have highlighted uncertainty about which courts will have jurisdiction in cross-border disputes and the enforcement of judgments from 1 January 2021:

  1. On 27 August 2020, the EU Commission published a revised Notice setting out its view of how various conflict of laws issues will be determined post-Brexit, including jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments (the EU Notice).[1]
  2. On 28 September 2020, the UK deposited its instrument of accession to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention 2005), ensuring continuity in application of the Hague Convention 2005 after the end of the Brexit transition period.[2]
  3. On 30 September 2020, the UK Ministry of Justice published “Cross-border civil and commercial legal cases: guidance for legal professionals from 1 January 2021” (the MoJ Guidance),[3] which is the UK equivalent to the EU Notice.
  4. On 1 October 2020, the deadline passed for the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano Convention 2007) to be approved in time for it to apply as of the end of the Brexit transition period, absent some work-around agreed at the time of any eventual Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

English High Court holds that alleged breaches of a director’s statutory duties can engage the ‘iniquity exception’, which disapplies legal professional privilege under certain conditions.

By Stuart Alford QC and George Schurr

In Barrowfen Properties v Girish Dahyanhai Patel & Ors.,[i] the English High Court held that the ‘iniquity exception’ to legal professional privilege will become engaged if:

  • An applicant can establish a “strong prima facie case” that a respondent director has breached at least one of their statutory directors’ duties.[ii]
  • Either of the following is true:
    • Those allegations involve fraud, dishonesty, bad faith, or sharp practice.
    • The director consciously or deliberately preferred their own interests over the interests of the company, and did so “under a cloak of secrecy”.

The court held that the appropriate standard of proof in such circumstances (“a strong prima facie case”) is a lower threshold than both (i) the balance of probabilities, and (ii) the summary judgment test (no real prospect of success).